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The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from
research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer
concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations
call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant
evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the
Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that one’s environment
can influence one’s psychological states, as well as recent work on inducing illusions of
embodiment. Then, in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect,” we go
on to discuss recent evidence indicating that immersion in VR can have psychological
effects that last after leaving the virtual environment. In the second part of the article, we
turn to the risks and recommendations. We begin, in Section “The Research Ethics of
VR,” with the research ethics of VR, covering six main topics: the limits of experimental
environments, informed consent, clinical risks, dual-use, online research, and a general
point about the limitations of a code of conduct for research. Then, in Section “Risks for
Individuals and Society,” we turn to the risks of VR for the general public, covering four
main topics: long-term immersion, neglect of the social and physical environment, risky
content, and privacy. We offer concrete recommendations for each of these 10 topics,
summarized in Table 1.
Keywords: ethics, virtual reality, augmented reality, substitutional reality, depersonalization disorder, derealization,
informed consent, dual use

PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Media reports indicate that virtual reality (VR) headsets will be commercially available in early 2016,
or shortly thereafter, with offerings from, for example, Facebook (Oculus), HTC and Valve (Vive)
Microsoft (HoloLens), and Sony (Morpheus). There has been a good bit of attention devoted to the
exciting possibilities that this new technology and the research behind it have to offer, but there has
been less attention devoted to novel ethical issues or the risks and dangers that are foreseeable with the
widespread use of VR. Here, we wish to list some of the ethical issues, present a first, non-exhaustive
list of those risks, and offer concrete recommendations for minimizing them. Of course, all this takes
place in a wider sociocultural context: VR is a technology, and technologies change the objective
world. Objective changes are subjectively perceived, and may lead to correlated shifts in value judgments. VR technology will eventually change not only our general image of humanity but also our
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understanding of deeply entrenched notions, such as “conscious
experience,” “selfhood,” “authenticity,” or “realness.” In addition,
it will transform the structure of our life-world, bringing about
entirely novel forms of everyday social interactions and changing
the very relationship we have to our own minds. In short, there
will be a complex and dynamic interaction between “normality”
(in the descriptive sense) and “normalization” (in the normative
sense), and it is hard to predict where the overall process will lead
us (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011).
Before beginning, we should quickly situate this article within
the larger field of the philosophy of technology. Brey (2010) has
offered a helpful taxonomy dividing the philosophy of technology into the classical works from the mid-twentieth century,
on the one hand, and more recent developments that follow an
“empirical turn” by focusing on the nature of particular emerging
technologies, on the other hand. We intend the present article to
be a contribution to the latter kind of philosophy of technology. In
particular, we are investigating foundational issues in the applied
ethics of VR, with a heavy emphasis on recent empirical results.
Both authors have been participants in the collaborative project
Virtual Embodiment and Robotic Re-Embodiment (VERE), a
5-year research program funded by the European Commission.1
Despite this explicit focus, we do not mean to imply that the
issues investigated here will not find fruitful application to themes
from classical twentieth century philosophy of technology (see
Franssen et al., 2009). Consider, for instance, Martin Heidegger’s
influential treatment of the way in which modern technology
distorts our metaphysics of the natural world (Heidegger, 1977;
also Borgmann, 1984), or Herbert Marcuse’s prescient account
of industrial society’s ongoing creation of false needs that undermine our capacities for individuality (Marcuse, 1964). As should
become clear from the examples below, immersive VR introduces
new and dramatic ways of disrupting our relationship to the natural world (see Neglect of Others and the Physical Environment).
Likewise, the newly created “need” to interact using social media
will become even more psychologically ingrained as the interactions begin to take place while we are embodied in virtual spaces
(see The Effects of Long-Term Immersion and O’Brolcháin et al.,
2016). In sum, the fact that connections with classical philosophy
of technology will remain largely implicit in this article should
not be taken to suggest that they are not of great importance.
The main focus will be on immersive VR, in which subjects
use a head-mounted display (HMD) to create the feeling of being
within a virtual environment. Although our main topic involves
the experience of immersion, some of the concerns raised, such
as neglect of the physical environment (see Neglect of Others and
the Physical Environment), can be applied to extended use of an
HMD even when users do not experience immersion such as

when merely using the device for 3D viewing. Many of our points
are also relevant for other types of VR hardware, such as CAVE
projection. One central area of concern has to do with illusions of
embodiment, in which one has the feeling of being embodied other
than in one’s actual physical body (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008;
Slater et al., 2010). In VR, for instance, one might have the illusion
of being embodied in an avatar that looks just like one’s physical
body. Or one might have the illusion of being embodied in an
avatar of a different size, age, or skin color. In all of these cases,
insight into the illusory nature of the overall state is preserved.
The fact that VR technology can induce illusions of embodiment
is one of the main motivations behind our investigation into the
new risks generated by using VR by researchers and by the general
public. Traditional paradigms in experimental psychology cannot
induce these strong illusions. Similarly, watching a film or playing
a non-immersive video game cannot create the strong illusion of
owning and controlling a body that is not your own. Although
our main focus will be on VR (see Figure 1), many of the risks and
recommendations can be extended to augmented reality (Azuma,
1997; Metz, 2012; Huang et al., 2013 and substitutional reality
(Suzuki et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2013). In augmented reality (AR,
see Figure 2), one experiences virtual elements intermixed with
one’s actual physical environment.
Following Milgram and colleagues (Milgram and Kishino,
1994; Milgram and Colquhoun, 1999), it may be helpful here
to consider augmented reality along the Reality–Virtuality
Continuum. The real environment is located at one extreme of
the continuum and an entirely virtual environment is located at
the other extreme. Displays can be placed along the continuum
according to whether they primarily represent the real environment while including some virtual elements (augmented reality)
or they primarily represent a virtual environment while including
some real elements (augmented virtuality). Much of the following
discussion will focus on entirely virtual environments, but readers
should keep in mind that many of the concerns raised will also
apply to environments all along the Reality–Virtuality Continuum.
It is foreseeable that there will be ever new extensions and
special cases of VR. We return to this theme with some philosophical remarks at the end of the article. For now, let us at least
note that the very distinction between the real and the virtual is
ripe for further philosophical investigation. One example of such
a special, recent extension of VR that does not in itself form a
distinct new category is “substitutional reality” (SR, see Figure 3),
in which an omni-directional video feed gives one the illusion of
being in a different location in space and/or time, and insight may
not be preserved. Readers should keep in mind that VR headsets
will likely enable users to toggle between virtual, augmented, and
substitutional reality, and to adjust one’s location on the Reality–
Virtuality Continuum, thus somewhat blurring the boundaries
between kinds of immersive environments.
We divide our discussion into two main areas. First, we will
address the research ethics of VR. Then we will turn to issues arising with the use of VR by the general public for entertainment and
other purposes. To be clear upfront, we are not calling for general
restrictions on an individual’s liberty to spend time (and money)
in VR. In open democratic societies, such regulations must be
based on rational arguments and available empirical evidence,

The project, as well as the current publication, is funded under the EU 7th
Framework Program, Future and Emerging Technologies (Grant 257695). VERE
aimed at dissolving the boundary between the human body and surrogate representations in immersive virtual reality and physical reality, giving people the illusion
that their surrogate representation is their own body. See http://www.vereproject.
eu/ for more. We thank members of the VERE consortium for discussing many of
the issues in this article during our VERE Ethics Workshops in February 2013 and
September 2015.
1
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FIGURE 1 | Illusory ownership of an avatar in virtual reality. Here, a subject is shown wearing a head-mounted display and a body tracking suit. The subject can see
his avatar in VR moving in synchrony with his own movements in a virtual mirror. In this case, the avatar is designed to replicate Sigmund Freud in order to enable subjects
to counsel themselves. Thus, creating what Freud may have called an instance of avatar-introjection! (Image used with kind permission from Osimo et al., 2015.)

FIGURE 2 | An augmented reality hand illusion. Here, augmented reality is used to show the subject a virtual hand in a biologically realistic location relative to his
own body. This case differs from virtual reality due to the fact that the subject sees the virtual hand embedded in his own physical environment rather than in an
entirely virtual environment (image used with kind permission from Keisuke Suzuki).

FIGURE 3 | Immersion in the past using substitutional reality. In this example, substitutional reality is used to allow switching between a live view of the scene
and a panoramic recording of that scene from the past. Note that SR could also be used to provide live (or recorded) panoramic input from a distant location,
creating the illusion that one is “present” somewhere else (image used with kind permission from Anil Seth).
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and they should be guided by a general principle of liberalism:
in principle, the individual citizen’s freedom and autonomy in
dealing with their own brain and in choosing their own desired
states of mind (including all of their phenomenal and cognitive
properties) should be maximized. As a matter of fact, we would
even argue for a constitutional right to mental self-determination
(Bublitz and Merkel, 2014), somewhat limiting the authority
of the government, because the above-mentioned values of
individual freedom and mental autonomy seem to be absolutely
fundamental to the idea of a liberal democracy involving a
separation of powers. However, once such a general principle has
been clearly stated, the much more interesting and demanding
task lies in helping individuals exercise this freedom in an intelligent way, in order to minimize potential adverse effects and the
overall psychosocial cost to society as a whole (Metzinger, 2009a;
Metzinger and Hildt, 2011). New technologies like VR open a vast
space of potential actions. This space has to be constrained in a
rational and evidence-based manner.
Similarly, we fully support ongoing research using VR – indeed,
we argue below that there are ethical demands to do more
research using it, research that is motivated in part with the goal
of mitigating harm for the general public. But we do think that it
is prudent to anticipate risks and we wish to spread awareness of
how possibly to avoid, or at least minimize, those risks.2 Before
entering into the concrete details, we are going to make the case
for being especially concerned about VR technology in contrast,
say, to television or non-immersive video games. We do so in
two steps. First, in Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we
cover some of the relevant discoveries from psychology in the
past decades, including the scientific foundation for illusions of
embodiment. Then in Section “Illusions of Embodiment and
Their Lasting Effect,” we cover the more recent experimental
work that has begun to reveal the lasting psychological effects of
these illusions. Then in Section “Recommendations for the Use
of VR by Researchers and Consumers,” we will cover the research
ethics of VR followed by risks for the general public.

underlying the neurally realized part of the human self-model
[for example, of the body model in our brain, e.g., Metzinger
(2003), p. 355] that are largely genetically determined. However,
we also want to point out that human beings possess a large
number of epigenetic traits, that is, a stably heritable phenotype
resulting from changes in a chromosome without alterations in
the DNA sequence.

Context-Sensitivity All the Way Down

The way in which our behavior is sensitive to environmental
features is especially relevant here due to the fact that VR introduces a completely new type of environment, a new cognitive and
cultural niche, which we are now constructing for ourselves as a
species.
It is not excluded that extended interactions with VR
environments may lead to more fundamental changes,
not only on a psychological, but also on a biological level.
Some of the most famous experiments in psychology reveal
the context sensitivity of human behavior. These include the
Stanford Prison Experiment, in which normal subjects playing
roles as either prison guards or inmates began to show pathological behavioral traits (Haney et al., 1973), Milgram’s obedience experiments, in which subjects obeyed orders that they
believed to cause serious pain and be immoral (Milgram, 1974),
and Asch’s conformity experiments, in which subjects gave obviously incorrect answers to questions after hearing confederates,
all give the same incorrect answers (Asch, 1951). For a more
recent result showing the unconscious impact of environment
on behavior, the amount of money placed in a collection box
for drinks in a university break room was measured under a
condition in which the image of a pair of eyes was posted above
the collection box. With the eyes “watching,” coffee drinkers
placed three times as much money in the box compared to the
control condition with no eyes (Bateson et al., 2006). Effects
like this one may be particularly relevant in VR, because the
subjective experience of presence and being there is not only
determined by functional factors like the number and fidelity
of sensory input and output channels, the ability to modify the
virtual environment, but also, importantly, the level of social
interactivity, for example, in terms of actually being recognized
as an existing person by others in the virtual world (Heeter, 1992;
Metzinger, 2003). As investigations into VR have interestingly
shown, a phenomenal reality as such becomes more real – in
terms of the subjective experience of presence – as more agents
recognizing one and interacting with one are contained in this
reality. Phenomenologically, ongoing social cognition enhances
both this reality and the self in their degree of “realness.” This
principle will also hold if the subjective experience of ongoing
social cognition is of a hallucinatory nature.

Plasticity in the Human Mind

One central result of modern experimental psychology is that
human behavior can be strongly influenced by external factors
while the agent is totally unaware of this influence. Behavior is
context sensitive and the mind is plastic, which is to say that
it is capable of being continuously shaped and re-shaped by a
host of causal factors. These results, some of which we present
below, suggest that our environment, including technology and
other humans, has an unconscious influence on our behavior.
Note that the results do not conflict with the manifest fact that
most of us have relatively stable character traits over time. After
all, most of us spend our time in relatively stable environments.
And there may be many aspects of the functional architecture
Behr et al. (2005) have addressed similar themes about practical issues in VR
research and applications. Here, we wish to address concerns that go beyond their
initial treatment of the topic. More recently, O’Brolcháin et al. (2016) have covered
ways in which the conjunction of VR with social networks might raise threats
to privacy and autonomy. We will engage with some of their concerns at various
points below.
2
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occurrent behavior. It is plausible to assume that this will be true
of novel media environments as well. Importantly, unlike other
forms of media, VR can create a situation in which the user’s entire
environment is determined by the creators of the virtual world,
including “social hallucinations” induced by advanced avatar
technology. Unlike physical environments, virtual environments
can be modified quickly and easily with the goal of influencing
behavior.

2009; Windt, 2010; Metzinger, 2013a,b); and in some configurations (e.g., “being one with the world”), there is also a maximal
UI, likely constituted by the most general phenomenal property
available, namely, the integrated nature of phenomenality per se
(Metzinger, 2013a,b).
VR technology directly targets the mechanism by which
human beings phenomenologically identify with the
content of their self-model.

The comprehensive character of VR plus the potential
for the global control of experiential content introduces
opportunities for new and especially powerful forms of
both mental and behavioral manipulation, especially
when commercial, political, religious, or governmental
interests are behind the creation and maintenance of the
virtual worlds.

The rubber hand illusion is a simple localized illusion of
embodiment that can be induced by having subjects look
at a visually realistic rubber hand in a biologically realistic
position (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005). When the rubber hand is stroked synchronously with
the subject’s physical hand (which is hidden from view),
subjects experience the rubber hand as their own.3 While the
rubber hand can be used to create a partial illusion of embodiment, the same basic idea can be used to create the full-body
illusion, on a global level. Subjects look through goggles
through which they see a live video feed of their own bodies
(or of a virtual body) located a short distance in front of their
actual location. When they see their bodies being stroked on
the back, and feel themselves being stroked at the same time,
subjects sometimes feel as if the body that they see in front of
them is their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; see Figure 4).
This illusion is much weaker and more fragile than the RHI,
but it has given us valuable new insights into the bottom-up
construction of our conscious, bodily self-model in the brain
(Metzinger, 2014). In more recent work, Maselli and Slater
(2013) have found that tactile feedback is not required for an
illusion of embodiment. They found that a virtual arm with a
realistic appearance co-located with the subject’s actual arm
is sufficient to induce the illusion of ownership of the virtual
arm. In addition to visual and tactile signals, recent work
suggests that manipulations of interoceptive signals, such as
heartbeat, can also influence our experience of embodiment
(Aspell et al., 2013; Seth, 2013).
The results sketched in these three sections reveal not only
categories of risks but also three ways in which the human mind
is plastic. First, there is “context-sensitivity all the way down,”
which may involve hitherto unknown kinds of epigenetic trait
formation in new environments. Second, there is evidence that
behavior can be strongly influenced by environment and context,
and in a deep way. Third, illusions of embodiment can be induced
fairly easily in the laboratory, directly targeting the human UI
itself. These results can be taken together as empirical premises
for an argument stating not only that there may be unexpected
psychological risks if illusions of embodiment are misused,
or used recklessly, but that, if we are interested in minimizing
potential damage and future psychosocial costs, these risks are
themselves ethically relevant. In the following section, we review
initial evidence that connects the three strands of evidence that

However, the plasticity of the mind is not limited to behavioral
traits. Illusions of embodiment are possible because the mind is
plastic to such a degree that it can misrepresent its own embodiment. To be clear, illusions of embodiment can arise from normal
brain activity alone, and need not imply changes in underlying
neural structure. Such illusions occur naturally in dreams,
phantom limb experiences, out-of-body experiences, and Body
Integrity Identity Disorder (Brugger et al., 2000; Metzinger,
2009b; Hilti et al., 2013; Ananthaswamy, 2015; Windt, 2015),
and they sometimes include a shift in what has been termed the
phenomenal “unit of identification” in consciousness research
(UI; Metzinger, 2013a,b), the conscious content that we currently
experience as “ourselves” (please note that in the current paper
“UI” does not refer to “user interface,” but always to the specific
experiential content of “selfhood,” as explained below). This may
be the deepest theoretical reason why we should be cautious
about the psychological effects of applied VR: this technology
is unique in beginning to target and manipulate the UI in our
brain itself.

Direct UI-Manipulation

The UI is the form of experiential content that gives rise to
autophenomenological reports of the type “I am this!” For
every self-conscious system, there exists a phenomenal unit of
identification, such that the system possesses a single, conscious
model of reality; the UI is a part of this model; at any given
point in time, the UI can be characterized by a specific and
determinate representational content, which in turn constitutes
the system’s phenomenal self-model (PSM, Metzinger, 2003) at
t. Please note how the UI does not have to be identical with
the content of the conscious body image or a region within it
(like a fictitious point behind the eyes). For example, the UI
can be moved out of and behind the head as phenomenally
experienced in a repeatable and controllable fashion by direct
electrical stimulation while preserving the visual first-person
perspective with its origin behind the eyes (de Ridder et al.,
2007). For human beings, the UI is dynamic and can be highly
variable. There exists a minimal UI, which likely is constituted
by pure spatiotemporal self-location (Blanke and Metzinger,
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FIGURE 4 | Creating a whole-body analog of the rubber-hand illusion. (A) Participant (dark blue trousers) sees through a HMD his own virtual body (light blue
trousers) in 3D, standing 2 m in front of him and being stroked synchronously or asynchronously at the participant’s back. In other conditions, the participant sees
either (B) a virtual fake body (light red trousers) or (C) a virtual non-corporeal object (light gray) being stroked synchronously or asynchronously at the back. Dark
colors indicate the actual location of the physical body or object, whereas light colors represent the virtual body or object seen on the HMD. (Image used with kind
permission from M. Boyer.).

we have just presented. That is, we review initial evidence that
illusions of embodiment can be combined with a change in environment and context in order to bring about lasting psychological
effects in subjects.

risks of existing media technology for the general public. A first
important result from VR research involves what is known as
the virtual pit (Meehan et al., 2002). Subjects are given a HMD
that immerses them in a virtual environment in which they are
standing at the edge of a deep pit. In one kind of experiment
involving the pit, they are instructed to lean over the edge and
drop a beanbag onto a target at the bottom. In order to enhance
the illusion of standing at the edge, the subject stands on the ledge
of a wooden platform in the lab that is only 1.5″ from the ground.
Despite their belief that they were in no danger because the pit was
“only” virtual, subjects nonetheless show increased signs of stress
through increases in heart rate and skin conductance (ibid.). In a

Illusions of Embodiment and Their
Lasting Effect

In the last several years, a number of studies have found a
psychological influence on subjects while immersed in a virtual
environment. These studies suggest that VR poses risks that
are novel, that go beyond the risks of traditional psychological
experiments in isolated environments, and that go beyond the
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USE OF
VR BY RESEARCHERS AND CONSUMERS

variation of the virtual pit, subjects may be told to walk across the
pit over a virtual beam. In the lab, a real wooden beam is placed
where subjects see the virtual beam. As one might expect, this
version of the pit also elicits strong feelings of stress and fear.4
More recently, an experiment reproducing the famous Milgram
obedience experiments in VR found that subjects reacted as if the
shocks they administered were real, despite believing that they
were merely virtual (Slater et al., 2006).
In addition to a strong emotional response from immersion,
there is evidence that experiences in VR can also influence
behavioral responses. One example of a behavioral influence
from VR has been named the Proteus Effect by Nick Yee and
Jeremy Bailenson. This effect occurs when subjects “conform
to the behavior that they believe others would expect them to
have” based on the appearance of their avatar (Yee and Bailenson,
2007, p. 274; Kilteni et al., 2013). They found, for example, that
subjects embodied in a taller avatar negotiated more aggressively
than subjects in a shorter avatar (ibid.). Changes in behavior
while in the virtual environment are of ethical concern, since
such behavior can have serious implications for our non-virtual
physical lives – for example, as financial transactions take place
in a non-physical environment (Madary, 2014).
But perhaps even more concerning for our purposes is evidence that behavior while in the virtual environment can have a
lasting psychological impact after subjects return to the physical
world. Hershfield et al. (2011) found that subjects embodying
avatars that look like aged versions of themselves show a tendency to allocate more money for their retirement after leaving
the virtual environment. Rosenberg et al. (2013) had subjects
perform tasks in a virtual city. Subjects were allowed to fly
through the city either using a helicopter or by their own body
movements, like Superman. They found that subjects given
the superpower were more likely to show altruistic behavior
afterwards – they were more likely to help an experimenter pick
up spilled pens. Yoon and Vargas (2014) found a similar result,
although not using fully immersive VR. They had subjects play
a video game as either a superhero, a supervillain, or a neutral
control avatar. After playing the game, subjects were given a
tasting task that they were told was unrelated to the gaming
experiment. Subjects were given either chocolate or chili sauce
to taste, and then told to measure out the amount of food for the
subsequent subject to taste. Those who played as heroes poured
out more chocolate, while those who played as villains poured
out more chili.
The psychological impact of immersive VR has also been
explored in a beneficent application. Peck et al. (2013) gave subjects an implicit racial bias test at least 3 days before immersion
and then immediately after the immersion. In the experiment,
subjects were embodied in an avatar with either light skin, dark
skin, purple skin, or they were immersed in the virtual world with
no body. They found that subjects who were embodied in the
dark-skinned avatar showed a decrease in implicit racial bias, at
least temporarily.

With the results from the first section of the paper in mind as
illustrative examples, we now move on to make concrete recommendations for VR in both scientific research (see The Research
Ethics of VR) and consumer applications (see Risks for Individuals
and Society). Our main recommendations are italicized and listed
together in Table 1.

The Research Ethics of VR

In this section, we cover questions about the ethics of conducting
research either on VR, or, perhaps more interestingly, research
using VR as a tool. For example, it is plausible to assume that in
the future there will be many experiments combining real-time
fMRI and VR or ones using animal subjects in VR (Normand
et al., 2012), which are not only about understanding or improving VR itself but only use it a research tool. To begin with a short
example, Behr et al. (2005) have covered the research ethics of VR
from a practical perspective, emphasizing that the risk of motion
sickness must be minimized and that researchers ought to assist
subjects as they leave the virtual environment and readjust to the
real world. In this part of the article, we indicate new issues in the
research ethics of VR that were not covered in Behr et al.’s initial
treatment. In particular, we will raise the following six issues:
• the limits of experimental environments,
• informed consent with regard to the lasting psychological
effects of VR,
• risks associated with clinical applications of VR,
• the possibility of using results of VR research for malicious
purposes (dual use),
• online research using VR, and
• a general point about the inherent limitations of a code of
conduct for research.
For each of these issues, we offer concrete recommendations
for researchers using VR as well as ethics committees charged
with evaluating the permissibility of particular experimental
paradigms using VR.

Ethical Experimentation

What are the limits to what we can do ethically as experiments in
VR? We recommend, at the very least, that researchers ought to
follow the principle of non-maleficence: do no harm. This principle is a central component of research ethics on human subjects
where it is often discussed with the accompanying principle of
beneficence: maximize well-being for the subjects. Note how such
a principle applies to all sentient beings capable of suffering, like
non-human animals or even potential artificial subjects of experience in the future (Althaus et al., 2015, p. 10). We will return
to the principle of beneficence in VR in the following section.
The principle of non-maleficence can be found in the codes of
ethical conduct for both the American Psychological Association
(General Principle A)5 as well as in the British Psychological

For some nice anecdotal accounts of experiences with the virtual pit, see Blascovich
and Bailenson, 2011: 38-42.
4
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environments. The principle of non-maleficence should be applied
in the sense that experiments should not be conducted if the
outcome involves foreseeable harm to the subjects. On the other
hand, the same principle implies a sustained striving for rational,
evidence-based minimization of risks in the more distant future.
We, therefore, suggest that careful experiments designed with the
beneficent intention of discovering the psychological impact of
immersion in VR are ethically permissible.
In order to adhere to the principle of non-maleficence,
researchers (and ethics committees) will need to utilize their
knowledge of experimental psychology as well as their knowledge of results specific to VR. The kinds of results sketched
in Sections “Plasticity in the Human Mind” and “Illusions of
Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect” will be directly relevant
for evaluating whether a line of experimentation violates
non-maleficence. Similarly, the selection of subjects for VR
experiments must be done with special care. New methods of
prescreening for individuals with high risk factors must be incrementally developed, and funding for the development of such
new methodologies needs to be allocated. We, therefore, urge
careful screening of subjects to minimize the risks of aggravating
an existing psychological disorder or an undetected psychiatric
vulnerability (Rizzo et al., 1998; Gregg and Tarrier, 2007). Many
experiments using VR currently seek to treat existing psychiatric disorders. The screening process for such experiments has
the goal of selecting subjects who exhibit signs and symptoms of
an existing condition. The screening process should also include
exclusion criteria specific to possible risks posed by VR. Ideally,
the VR research community will seek to establish an empirically
motivated standard set of exclusion criteria. As we will discuss
in Section “The Effects of Long-Term Immersion” below, of
particular concern are vulnerabilities to disorders that could
potentially become aggravated by prolonged immersion and illusions of embodiment, such as Depersonalization/Derealization
Disorder (DDD; see American Psychiatric Association (2013),
DSM-5: 300.14). Standard exclusion criteria may involve, for
instance, scoring above a particular threshold on scales testing
for dissociative experiences (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986) or
depersonalization (Sierra and Berrios, 2000). Of course, there
may be cases in which experimenters seek to include subjects
with experiences of dissociation in order to investigate ways
in which VR might be used to treat the underlying conditions,
such as treating post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) through
exposure therapy in VR (Botella et al., 2015). In those special
cases, it is important to implement alternative exclusion criteria,
such as Rothbaum et al. (2014), who excluded subjects with a
history of psychosis, bipolar disorder, and suicide risk.

Society (Principle 2.4). The British Psychological Society offers
the following recommendation:
Harm to research participants must be avoided. Where
risks arise as an unavoidable and integral element of
the research, robust risk assessment and management
protocols should be developed and complied with.
Normally, the risk of harm must be no greater than that
encountered in ordinary life, i.e., participants should not
be exposed to risks greater than or additional to those to
which they are exposed in their normal lifestyles (The
British Psychological Society, 2014, p. 11).
Following this recommendation in the case of VR might
raise some novel challenges due to the entirely new nature of the
technology. For instance, a well-known domain of application for
the principle of non-maleficence has been in clinical trials for
new pharmacological agents. Although this domain of research
ethics still faces important and controversial issues (Wendler,
2012), thinkers in the debate can avail themselves of the history of
medical technology. In many cases, precedents can be quoted. In
the case of VR, there is yet no history that we can use as a source
for insight. On the contrary, what is needed is a rational, ethically
sound process of precedence-setting.
In its general form, the principle of non-maleficence for VR
can be expressed as follows:
No experiment should be conducted using virtual reality
with the foreseeable consequence that it will cause serious
or lasting harm to a subject.
Although recommending adherence to this principle is nothing new, implementing this principle in VR laboratories may be
challenging for the following reason. Attempts to apply nonmaleficence in VR can encounter a dilemma of sorts. On the one
hand, a goal of the research ought to be, as we suggest below, to
gain a better understanding of the risks posed for individuals
using VR. For instance, does the duration of immersion pose
a greater risk for the user? Might some virtual environments
be more psychologically disturbing than others? VR research
should seek to answer these and similar questions. In particular,
open-ended longitudinal studies will be necessary to assess the
risk of long-term usage for the general population, just like with
new substances for pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement
or medical treatments more generally. On the other hand, it
is difficult to assess these risks without running experiments
that generate those possible risks, thus raising worries about
non-maleficence.
A strict adherence to non-maleficence would require avoiding all experiments using virtual environments for which the
risk is unknown. We suggest that this strict interpretation of
non-maleficence is not optimal, because substantial ethical
assessments should always be evidence-based and necessarily
involve the investigation of greater time-windows and larger
populations. VR researchers could and should provide a valuable
service by informing the public and policy makers of the possible
risks of spending large amounts of time in unregulated virtual
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Informed Consent

The results presented above clearly suggest that VR experiences
can have lasting psychological impact. This new knowledge about
the lasting influence of experiences in VR must not be withheld
from subjects in new VR experiments.
We recommend that informed consent for VR experiments ought to include an explicit statement to the effect
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that immersive VR can have lasting behavioral influences
on subjects, and that some of these risks may be presently
unknown.

of the research, rather than motivated by false hope or even
desperation.
VR researchers aiming at new clinical applications should
therefore work slowly and carefully, in close collaboration
with physicians who may be better situated to make
informed judgments about the suitability of particular
patients for new trials.

Subjects should be made aware of this possibility out of respect
for their autonomy (as included, for example, in the American
Psychological Association General Principle D)6. That is, if an
experiment might alter their behavior without their awareness
of this alteration, then such an experiment could be seen as a
threat to the autonomy of the subject. A reasonable way to
preserve autonomy, we suggest, is simply to inform subjects of
possible lasting effects. Please again note the principled problem
that research animals are not able to give informed consent, their
interest needs to be represented by humans. Also note that we
are not suggesting that subjects ought to be informed about the
particular effects that are being investigated in the experiment.
Thus, our recommendation should not raise the concern that
informing subjects may compromise researchers’ abilities to test
for particular behavioral effects.

Therapeutic and clinical applications should be investigated
only in the presence of certified medical personnel.
Another relevant concern here is the way in which the general
public keeps informed of new developments in science through the
popular media. Members of the general public with less interest in
science may have a more difficult time gleaning scientific knowledge from the media than those with more interest (Takahashi
and Tandoc, 2015). When considering their responsibility as
scientists to communicate new results to the public (Fischhoff,
2013; Kueffer and Larson, 2014), VR researchers working in clinical applications must be careful to avoid language that might give
false hope to patients.
We should also note here that there are other practical concerns
about the use of VR for medical interventions. For instance, once
the technology is available for patients to use, who will pay for
it? Should medical insurance pay for HMDs and new software?
How do we achieve distributive justice and avoid a situation where
only privileged members of society benefit from technological
advances? We make no recommendation here, but flag this question as something that needs to be considered by policy makers.
Similarly, HMDs, CAVE immersive displays, and motion-tracking
technology may have to be reclassified as medical devices.
One risk when performing the research necessary for developing such applications is that the patients involved may develop
a false sense of hope due to the non-traditional nature of the
intervention. As this kind of research progresses, scientists must
continue to be honest with patients so as not to generate false
hope. There is also an overlap between media ethics and the ethics
of VR technology: a related example is that many of the early
experiments on full-body illusions (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager
et al., 2007) have been falsely overreported as creating full-blown
“out-of-body experiences” (Metzinger, 2003, 2009a,b), and scientists have perhaps not done enough to correct this misrepresentation of their own work in the media.8 While incremental progress
has clearly been made, large parts of the public still falsely believe
that scientists “have created OBEs in the lab.”

Practical Applications: False Hope and Beneficence

Another concern has to do with various applications of VR. One of
many promising applications for VR research is in the treatment
of disease, damage, and other health-related issues, especially
mental health.7 For instance, researchers found that immersing
burn victims in an icy virtual environment can mitigate their
experience of pain during medical procedures (Hoffman et al.,
2011). Here, we wish to raise some concerns about applications of
VR. The first concern is that patients may develop false hope with
regard to clinical applications of VR. The second concern is that
applications of VR may encounter a tension between beneficence
and autonomy.
Patients may believe that treatment using VR is better than
traditional interventions merely due to the fact that it is a new
technology, or an experimental application of existing technology. This sense of false hope is known as the “therapeutic
misconception” in the literature on the ethics of clinical research
(Appelbaum et al., 1987; Kass et al., 1996; Lidz and Appelbaum,
2002; Chen et al., 2003). Researchers using VR for clinical
research must be aware of established techniques for combating
the therapeutic misconception in their subjects. For example,
one established guideline for investigating new clinical applications is that of “clinical equipoise,” which is the requirement that
there be genuine uncertainty in the medical community as to the
best form of treatment (Freedman, 1987). It is important that
researchers communicate their own sense of this uncertainty in
a clear manner to volunteer subjects. Similarly, as Chen et al.
(2003) note, physicians who have a lasting relationship with their
patients may be better suited to form a judgment as to whether
the patient is motivated by a clear understanding of the nature

Overall, scientists and the media need to be clear and
honest with the public about scientific progress, especially
in the area of using VR for medical treatment.
The second concern about applications of VR has to do with
the well-known tension between autonomy and beneficence in

http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/
VR has been used to treat a wide range of mental health issues, including eating disorders (Ferrer-Garcia et al., 2015), acrophobia (Emmelkamp et al., 2001),
agoraphobia (Botella et al., 2004), arachnophobia (Carlin et al., 1997), and PTSD
(Rothbaum et al., 2001). See Parsons and Rizzo (2008) for a meta-analysis of these
kinds of treatment.
6
7
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For some examples of the full-body illusion being misrepresented in the media, see:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/24/science/24body.html http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/health/6960612.stm http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/08/070823141057.
htm
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applied ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013: Chapter 6). As
the results surveyed in the first part of this article suggest, VR enables a powerful form of non-invasive psychological manipulation.
One obvious application of VR, then, would be to perform such
manipulations in order to bring about desirable mental states and
behavioral dispositions in subjects. Indeed, early experiments in
VR have done just that, making subjects willing to save more
for their retirement (Hershfield et al., 2011), perform better on
tests for implicit racial bias (Peck et al., 2013), and behave in a
more environmentally conscious manner (Ahn et al., 2014). In
a paternalistic spirit, such as that of the UK Behavioral Insights
Team, one might urge that beneficent VR applications such as
these should be put in place among the general populace, perhaps
as a new form of “public service announcement” for the twentyfirst century. Here, we wish to note that doing so may generate
another case of conflict between beneficence and autonomy. If
individuals do not seek to alter their psychological profile in the
ways intended by the beneficent VR interventions, then such
interventions may be considered a violation of their autonomy.

As the embodiment in avatars and physical robots may be functionally shallow and may provide only weaker and less stable forms
of self-control (for example, with regard to spontaneously arising
aggressive fantasies, see Metzinger, 2013c for an example), it is
not clear how such PSM-actions mediated via brain–computer
interfaces should be assessed in terms of accountability and ethical
responsibility.9
Just as VR can be used to increase empathy, it can conceivably be used to decrease empathy. Doing so would have obvious
military applications in training soldiers to have less empathy for
enemy combatants, to feel no remorse about doing violence. We
will not go further into the difficult issues regarding the use of
new technology in warfare, but we note this possible alternative
application of the technology. Apart from increasing or decreasing empathy, the power of VR to induce particular kinds of emotions could be used deliberately to cause suffering. Conceivably,
the suffering could be so extreme as to be considered torture.
Because of the transparency of the emotional layers in the human
self-model (Metzinger, 2003), it will be experienced as real, even
if it is accompanied by cognitive-level insight into the nature of
the overall situation. Powerful emotional responses occur even
when subjects are aware of the fact that they are in a virtual
environment (Meehan et al., 2002).

Dual Use

Dual use is a well-known problem in research ethics and the ethics
of technology, especially in the life sciences (Miller and Selgelid,
2008). Here, we use it to refer to the fact that technology can be
used for something other than its intended purpose, in particular
to military applications. In the context of VR technology, one
will immediately think not only of drone warfare, teleoperated
weapon systems, or “virtual suicide attacks,” but also of interrogation procedures and torture. It is not in the power of the scientists
and engineers who develop the technology to police its use, but
we can raise awareness about potential misuses of the technology
as a way of contributing to precautionary steps.
Here is an example. One possible application of VR would be
to rehabilitate violent offenders by immersing them in a virtual
environment that induces a strong sense of empathy for their
victims. We see no problem at all with voluntary participation
in such a promising use of the technology. But it is foreseeable
that governments and penal systems adopt mandatory treatment
using similar techniques, calling to mind Anthony Burgess’ A
Clockwork Orange. We will not comment on the moral acceptability of such a practice, noting that the details of implementation
may be an important – and more controllable – unknown factor.
Virtual embodiment constitutes historically new form of acting. Metzinger (2013c) introduced the notion of a “PSM-action” to
describe this new element more precisely. PSM-actions are those
actions in which a human being exclusively uses the conscious
self-model in her brain to initiate an action, causally bypassing
the non-neural body (as in Figure 5). Of course, there will have to
be feedback loops for complex actions, for instance, when seeing
through the camera eyes of a robot, perhaps adjusting a grasping
movement in real-time (which is still far from possible today). But
the relevant causal starting point of the entire action is no longer
the body made of flesh and bones, but the conscious self-model
in our brain. We simulate an action in the self-model, in the inner
image of our body, and a machine performs it. PSM-actions are
almost purely “mental,” put they may have far-reaching causal
consequences in the real world, for example, in combat situations.
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Torture in a virtual environment is still torture. The fact
that one’s suffering occurs while one is immersed in a
virtual environment does not mitigate the suffering itself.

VR Research and the Internet

A final concern for the research ethics portion of this article
has to do with the use of the internet in conjunction with VR
research. For instance, scientists may wish to observe the patterns of behavior for users under particular conditions. It is clear
that the internet will play a main role in the adoption of VR for
personal use. Users will be able to inhabit virtual environments
with other users through their internet connections, and perhaps
enjoy new forms of avatar-based intersubjectivity. As O’Brolcháin
et al. (2016) suggest, we will soon see a convergence of VR with
online social networks. The overall ethical risks of this imminent
development have been covered in detail by O’Brolcháin et al.
(2016); in this section, we will incorporate and expand on their
discussion with a focus on questions of research ethics.
There is a sizable body of literature covering the main issues
of internet research ethics (Ess and Association of Internet
Researchers Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Buchanan and
It is important to note that teleoperated weapon systems are used in an illegal
manner today, and it would not be rational to assume that the introduction of
military VR-technology in combination with brain–computer interfaces could lead
to a change in this deplorable situation. With German support, the United States
of America execute citizens of and in other sovereign states (e.g., Yemen, Somalia,
Pakistan) without charge, trial, or final judgment (the so-called “extrajudicial killings”), thereby violating international law (under which lethal force may be used
outside armed conflict zones only as a last resort to prevent imminent threats;
see Melzer, 2008 for background and discussion) as well as national law, human
rights, and humanitarian laws. The potential for further illegal or unethical military
applications of VR is high, and one of our major concerns.
9
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FIGURE 5 | “PSM-actions”: a test subject lies in a nuclear magnetic resonance tomograph at the Weizmann Institute in Israel. With the aid of data
goggles he sees an avatar, also lying in a scanner. The goal is to create the illusion that he is embodied in this avatar. The test subject’s motor imagery is classified
and translated into movement commands, setting the avatar in motion. After a training phase, test subjects were able to control a remote robot in France “directly
with their minds” via the Internet, while they were able to see the environment in France through the robot’s camera eyes. (Image used with kind permission from
Doron Friedman and Ori Cohen, cf. Cohen et al., 2014.)

Ess, 2008, 2009). Here, we address the following question:
how should these existing issues of internet research ethics be
approached for cases of internet research with the use of VR? The
two main issues that we will cover here are privacy and obtaining
informed consent. We will consider the internet both as a tool and
a venue for research (Buchanan and Zimmer, 2015), while noting
that virtual environments may place pressure on the distinction
between internet as research tool and internet as research venue.

Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org

Let us begin with the question of privacy. It is widely accepted
that researchers have an ethical obligation to treat confidentially
any information that may be used to identify their subjects (see,
for example, European Commission, 2013, p. 12). This obligation is based on the general right to privacy outside of a research
context (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 12, 1948;
European Commission Directive 95/46/EC). Practicing this
confidentiality may involve, for instance, erasing, or “scrubbing,”
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personally identifiable information from a data set (O’Rourke,
2007; Rothstein, 2010).
As O’Brolcháin et al. note, immersive virtual environments
will involve the recording of new kinds of personal information,
such as “eye-movements, emotions, and real-time reactions”
(2015, p. 8). We would like to add that immersive VR could eventually incorporate motion capture technology in order to record
the details of users’ bodily movements for the purpose of, for
example, representing their avatar as moving in a similar fashion.
Although implementing this scenario may be beyond the capabilities of the forthcoming commercial hardware, it is plausible
and rational to assume that the technology may evolve quickly to
include such options. Data regarding the kinematics of users will
be useful for researchers from a range of disciplines, especially
those interested in embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2014). On the
plausible assumption that one’s kinematics is very closely related
to one’s personality and the deep functional structure of bodily
self-consciousness – only your body moves in precisely this manner – there will a highly individual “kinematic fingerprint.” This
kind of data collection presents a special threat to privacy.
O’Brolcháin et al. (2016) recommend protecting the privacy
for users of online virtual environments through legislation and
through incentives to develop new ways of protecting privacy. As
a complement to these recommendations, we wish to highlight
the threat to privacy created by motion capture technology.
Unlike eye-movements and emotional reactions, one’s kinematics may be uniquely connected with one’s identity, as indicated
above. Researchers collecting such data must be aware of its
sensitive nature and the dangers of its misuse. In addition, commercial providers of cloud-based VR-technology will frequently
have an interest of “harvesting,” storing, and analyzing such data
and users should be informed about such possibilities and give
explicit consent to them.
A second main concern in the ethics of internet research is
that of informed consent. In contrast to informed consent for
traditional face-to-face experiments, internet researchers may
obtain consent by having subjects click “I agree” after being
presented with the relevant documentation. There are a number
of concerns and challenges regarding the practice of gaining
consent for research using the internet as a venue (Buchanan and
Zimmer, 2015, see section Privacy, below), including, of course,
the fact that actually reading internet privacy policies before
accepting them would take far more time than we are willing to
allocate – on one estimate, it would take each of us 244 h per year
(McDonald and Cranor, 2008).
We suggest that immersive VR will add further complications
to these existing issues due to its manipulation of bodily location
and its dissolution of boundaries between the real and the virtual.
Consider that entering a new internet venue, say a chatroom or a
forum, involves a fairly well-defined threshold at which informed
consent can be requested before one enters the venue. Due to
the centrality of the URL for using the web, one’s own location
in cyberspace is fairly easy to track. With VR, by contrast, it is
foreseeable that one’s movement through various virtual environments will be controlled by one’s bodily movements, through
facial gestures, or simply by the trajectory of visual attention in
a way unlike internet navigation using a mouse, keyboard, and
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navigation bar. In addition, and more interesting, it is also foreseeable that HMDs will incorporate simultaneous combinations
of augmented, substitutional, and VR, with the user being able to
toggle between elements of the three. Such a situation would add
ambiguity, and perhaps confusion, for attempts to determine the
user’s location in cyberspace. This ambiguity raises the likelihood
that users may give consent for data collection in a particular
virtual context but then become unaware of the continued data
collection as the user changes context. Such a situation might
occur if users of HMDs are able to toggle between, say, an entirely
virtual gaming environment, a look out of the window to the busy
street below presented through augmented reality, and a family
gathering hundreds of kilometers away using substitutional reality through an omni-directional camera set up at the party. This
worry can be addressed by giving users continuous reminders
(after, of course, they have given informed consent) that their
behavior is being recorded for research purposes. Perhaps the
visual display could include a small symbol for the duration of
the time in which data are being collected.
We leave the implementational details open, but urge the
scientific community to take steps to avoid the abuse of
informed consent with this technology, especially in the
interest of preserving public trust.

A Note on the Limitations of a Code of Ethics for
Researchers

We would like to conclude our discussion of the research ethics
of VR by noting that the proposed (incomplete) code of conduct
is not intended to be sufficient for guaranteeing ethical research
in this domain. What we mean here is that following this code
should not be considered to be a substitute for ethical reasoning
on the part of researchers, reasoning that must always remain
sensitive to contextual and implementational details that cannot
be captured in a general code of conduct. We urge researchers to
conceive of our recommendations here as an aid in their ongoing
reflections about the ethical implications and permissibility of
their own work, and to proactively support us in developing this
ethics code into more detailed future versions. As we emphasized
in the beginning of the article, this work is only intended as a
first list of possible issues in the research ethics of VR and related
technologies. We intend to update and revise this list continuously as new issues arise, although the venue for future revisions
is undecided. In any case, we wish to open an invitation for
constructive input from researchers in this field regarding issues
that should be added or reformulated.
Scientists must understand that following a code of ethics
is not the same as being ethical. A domain-specific ethics
code, however consistent, developed, and fine grained
future versions of it may be, can never function as a
substitute for ethical reasoning itself.

Risks for Individuals and Society

Now consider possible issues that may arise with widespread
adoption of VR for personal use. Once the technology available

12

February 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 3

Madary and Metzinger

Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct

In order to better understand the risks, we recommend
longitudinal studies, further research into the psychological effects of long-term immersion.

to the general public for entertainment (and other) purposes,
individuals will have the option of spending extended periods
of time immersed in VR – in a way this is already happening
with the advent of smartphones, social networks, increasing
time online, etc. Some of the risks and ethical concerns that we
have already encountered in the early days of the internet10 will
reappear, though with the added psychological impact enabled
by embodiment and a strong sense of presence. We all know that
internet technology has long ago begun to change our self-models
and consequently our very own psychological structure. The combination with technologies of virtual and robotic re-embodiment
may greatly accelerate this development.
For instance, consider the infamous case of virtual rape in
LambdaMOO, the text-based multi-user dungeon (MUD). In
that virtual world, a player’s character known as “Mr.Bungle”
used a “voodoo doll” program to control the actions of other
characters in the house. He forced them to perform a range of
sexual acts, some of which are especially disturbing (Dibbell,
1993). Users of LambdaMOO were outraged, and at least one
user whose character was a victim of the virtual rape reported
suffering psychological trauma (ibid.). The relevant point to keep
in mind here is that this entire virtual transgression occurred in a
world that was entirely text based. We will soon be fully immersed
in virtual environments, actually embodying – rather than merely
describing – our avatars. The results sketched above in Section
“Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect” suggest that
the psychological impact of full immersion will be great, likely
far greater than the impact of text-based role-playing. We must
now take steps in order to help users avoid suffering psychological
trauma of various kinds. To this end, we will discuss four kinds
of foreseeable risks:
•
•
•
•

Of course, these studies must be conducted according to the
principles of informed consent, non-maleficence, and beneficence outlined in Section “The Research Ethics of VR.” There
are several possible risks that can be associated with long-term
immersion: addiction, manipulation of agency, unnoticed psychological change, mental illness, and lack of what is sometimes
vaguely called “authenticity” (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011, p. 253).
The risks that are discovered through longitudinal studies must
be directly and clearly communicated to users, preferably communicated within VR itself.
Psychologists have long expressed concern about internet
use disorder (Young, 1998), and it is a topic of ongoing research
(Price, 2011).11 This area of research must now expand in order to
include concerns about addiction to immersive VR, both online
and offline. Doing so will require monitoring users who prefer to
spend long periods of time immersed (see Steinicke and Bruder,
2014 for a first self-experiment). There are two relevant open
questions here. First, how might the diagnostic criteria for addiction to VR differ from the established criteria for internet use
disorder and related conditions? Note that the neurophysiological
underpinnings of VR addiction may differ from that of internet
use disorder (Montag and Reuter, 2015) due to the prolonged
illusion of embodiment created by VR technology, and because
it implies causal interaction with the low-level mechanisms constituting the UI. Second, can we make use of the recommended
treatments for internet use disorder for the purpose of helping
individuals with VR addiction? For instance, Gresle and Lejoyeux
(2011, p. 92) recommend informing users how much time they
have spent playing an online game, and including non-player
characters in the game to urge players to take breaks. It is plausible
that these strategies would be effective for immersive VR as well,
but focused research is needed.
A second concern about long-term immersion has to do with
the fact that immersive VR can manipulate the user’s sense of
agency (Gallagher, 2005). In order to generate a strong illusion
of ownership for the virtual body, the VR technology must track
the self-generated movements of the user’s real body and render
the virtual body as moving in a similar manner.12 When things are
working well, users experience an illusion of ownership of the virtual body (the avatar is my body), as well as an illusion of agency
(I am in control of the avatar). Importantly, the sense of agency in
VR is always indirect; control of the avatar is always mediated by
the technology. To be more precise, the virtual body representation
has been causally coupled with and temporarily embedded into
the currently active conscious self-model in the user’s brain – it
is not that some mysterious “self ” leaves the physical body and
“enters” the avatar, but rather a novel functional configuration in

long-term immersion;
neglect of embodied interaction and the physical environment;
risky content;
privacy.

We will offer several concrete recommendations for minimizing all four of these kinds of risks to the general public, a number
of which call for focused research initiatives.

The Effects of Long-Term Immersion

First, and perhaps most obviously, we simply do not know the
psychological impact of long-term immersion. So far, scientific
research using VR has involved only brief periods of immersion,
typically on the order of minutes rather than hours. Once the
technology is adopted for personal use, there will be no limits
on the time users choose to spend immersed. Similarly, most
research using VR has been conducted using adult subjects. Once
VR is available for commercial use, young adults and children
will be able to immerse themselves in virtual environments. The
risks that we discuss below are especially troublesome for these
younger users who are not yet psychologically and neurophysiologically fully developed.

Internet use disorder is listed as an area requiring further research in the DSM-5,
but it is not (yet) an official disorder according to the manual.
12
If the real body is not in motion, then co-location of the virtual body with the real
body as seen from the first-person perspective can be sufficient for the illusion of
ownership (Maselli and Slater, 2013).
11

See Gregory Lastowka, 2010 for a thoughtful treatment of some of the relevant
issues.
10
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which two body representations dynamically interact with each
other. However, the causal loop in principle enables bidirectional
forms of control, or even unnoticed involuntary influence. The
fact that the user’s sense of agency in VR is always continuously
maintained by the technology is an important one for at least two
reasons. First, the technology could be used to manipulate users’
sense of agency. Second, as we discuss in the general context of
mental health below, long-term immersion could cause low-level,
initially unnoticeable psychological disturbances involving a loss
of the sense of agency for one’s physical body.
VR technology could manipulate users’ sense of agency by
creating a false sense of agency for movements of the avatar that
do not correspond to the actual body movements of the user. The
same could be true for “social hallucinations,” i.e., the creation
of the robust subjective impression of ongoing social agency, of
engaging in a real, embodied form of social interaction, which,
however, in reality is only interaction with an unconscious
AI or with complex software controlling the simulated social
behavior of an avatar. Using only a computer screen, a modified
mouse, and headphones, a false sense of agency was created
in Daniel Wegner’s well-known “I Spy” experiments (Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002). In those experiments,
subjects reported that they felt themselves to be in control of
a cursor selecting an icon on a computer screen when in fact
the cursor was being controlled by someone else. The illusion
of control was induced by auditory priming – subjects heard
a word through headphones that had a semantic association
with the icon that was subsequently selected by the cursor. It is
reasonable to think that Wegner’s method can be implemented
rather easily in VR. While immersed in VR, subjects can receive
continuous audio and visual cues intended to influence their
psychological states. Future experimental work can determine
the conditions under which subjects will experience a sense
of agency for movements of the avatar that deviate from the
subject’s actual body movements (as during an OBE or in the
dream state, see Kannape et al., 2010 for an empirical study).
Important parameters here will likely be the timing of the false
movement, the degree to which the false movement deviates
from the actual position of the body, and the context of the
movement within the virtual environment (including, for
instance, the attentional state of the subject).
Creating a false sense of agency in VR is a clear violation of
the user’s autonomy, a violation that becomes especially worrisome as users spend longer and longer periods of time immersed.
Here, we will not insist that all cases of violating autonomy in
this manner are ethically impermissible, noting that some such
violations may be subtle and beneficent, a kind of virtual “nudge”
in the right direction (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). In addition,
human beings often willfully choose to decrease their autonomy,
as in drinking alcohol or playing games. But we do claim that
creating a false sense of agency in VR is an unacceptable violation
of individual autonomy when it is non-beneficent, such as when
it is done out of avarice, for example. Manipulating the sense of
agency for users in VR is a topic that deserves attention from
regulatory agencies.
A third concern that we wish to raise about long-term immersion is that of risks for mental health. As stated above, we simply
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do not know whether long-term immersion poses a threat for
mental health. Future research ought to investigate whether factors such as the duration of immersion, the content of the virtual
environment (including the user’s own avatar or the way in which
the software controls the automatic behavior, facial gestures, or
gaze of other avatars), and the user’s pre-existing psychological
profile might have lasting negative effects on the mental health
of users. As mentioned above (see Ethical Experimentation), we
suspect that heavy use of VR might trigger symptoms associated
with Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DSM-5 300.14).
Overall, the disorder can be characterized as having chronic feelings or sensations of unreality. In the case of depersonalization,
individuals experience an unreality of the bodily self, and in the
case of derealization, individuals experience the external world
as unreal. For instance, those suffering from the disorder report
feeling as if they are automata (loss of the sense of agency), and
feeling as if they are living in a dream (see Simeon and Abugel,
2009 for illustrative reports from individuals suffering from
depersonalization).13 Note that Depersonalization/Derealization
Disorder involves feelings of unreality but not delusions of unreality, there is a dissociation of the low-level phenomenology of
“realness” from high-level cognition. That is, someone suffering
from depersonalization may lose the sense of agency, but will not
thereby form the false belief that they are no longer in control of
their own actions.
Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder is relevant for
us here because VR technology manipulates the psychological
mechanisms involved in generating experiences of “realness,”
mechanisms similar or identical to those that go awry for those
suffering from the disorder. Even though users of VR do not believe
that the virtual environment is real, or that their avatar’s body is
really their own, the technology is effective because it generates
illusory feelings as if the virtual world is real (recall the virtual pit
from Section “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect”
above). What counts is the variable degree of transparency or
opacity of the user’s own conscious representations (Metzinger,
2003). Our concern is that long-term immersion could cause
damage to the neural mechanisms that create the feeling of reality,
of being in immediate contact with the world and one’s own body.
Heavy users of VR may begin to experience the real world and
their real bodies as unreal, effectively shifting their sense of reality
exclusively to the virtual environment.14 We recommend focused
longitudinal studies on the impact on mental health of long-term
immersion in VR. These studies should especially investigate
risks for dissociative disorders, such as Depersonalization/
Derealization Disorder.

There is a sizeable literature on depersonalization/derealization. Some of the
central works include Steinberg and Schnall, 2001; Radovic and Radovic, 2002;
Simeon and Abugel, 2009; Sierra, 2012.
14
We should be clear here that we are only speculating about a possible causal
connection between long-term immersion and experiences of depersonalization/
derealization. The etiology of the disorder is still not well understood. It is wellknown that episodes of depersonalization/derealization can be triggered by stress,
panic attacks, and the use of some drugs (Simeon, 2004). One prominent theory
suggests that chronic depersonalization/derealization may be caused by childhood
trauma (ibid.), though see Marshall et al. (2000).
13

14

February 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 3

Madary and Metzinger

Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct

A final concern for long-term immersion stems from the fact
that some may consider experiences in the virtual environment to
be “inauthentic,” because those experiences are artificially generated. This concern may remind some readers of Robert Nozick’s
well-known thought experiment about an “Experience Machine”
that can provide users with any experience they desire (Nozick,
1974, p. 42–45). Nozick uses the thought experiment to raise a
problem for utilitarianism, urging his readers to consider reasons
why one might not wish to “plug-in” to the machine, claiming
that “something matters to us in addition to experience” (Nozick,
1974, p. 44). The interesting question, of course, now becomes
what would happen if this “additional something” can be added
to the experience itself, for example by advanced VR-technology
creating the phenomenal quality of “authenticity,” of direct reference to something “meaningful,” for example by a more robust
version of naïve realism on the level of subjective experience
itself or by manipulation of the user’s emotional self-model.
While Nozick suggests that many of us would not wish to plugin to the experience machine for the reason just stated, recent
work by Felipe de Brigard suggests otherwise. De Brigard (2010)
presented students with several variations on the thought experiment all with an important twist on Nozick’s original version. In
de Brigard’s version, we are told that we are already plugged-in
to an experience machine and we are asked if we would like to
unplug in order to return to our “real” lives. Many of de Brigard’s
students replied that they would not wish to unplug, leading de
Brigard to suggest that our reactions to the thought experiment
are influenced more by the status quo bias (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988) than by our valuing of something more than
experience. It is the status quo bias, de Brigard suggests, that gives
us pause about plugging-in to the machine (in Nozick’s version of
the thought experiment) just as it is the status quo bias that gives
us pause about unplugging (in de Brigard’s version).
Overall, de Brigard’s results offer initial reasons to be skeptical
about Nozick’s supposition that we would not plug-in because we
value factors beyond experience alone. Even with this skepticism,
though, many of us may still feel that there is something false,
“inauthentic,” or undesirable about living large portions of one’s
life in an entirely artificial environment, such as VR. Apart from
the dubious essentialist metaphysics lurking behind the vague
and sometimes ideologically charged notion of an “authentic self,”
it is important to note how such intuitions are historically plastic
and culturally embedded: they may well change over time as
larger parts of the population begin to use advanced forms of VR
technology. As an example, please note how already today we find
a considerable number of people who are not able to grasp the
difference between “friendship” and “friendship on Facebook”
any more. Fully engaging with the issue of losing “authenticity”
in virtual environments would likely require entering into some
deep philosophical waters, and we are unable to do so here, though
we will touch on some of the relevant issues below. Apart from the
deeper philosophical issues, there is one important point that we
wish to make before moving on.
The point has to do with the way in which we imagine the
possibilities of VR for personal use. One reason behind an assertion that long-term immersion would be an inauthentic way of
spending one’s time is that one might assume that the content of
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immersive VR would be unedifying, making people more shallow
as they retreat from society in favor of an artificial social world
in which their decisions are made for them. Brolcháin et al. raise
this sort of concern:
With little exposure to “higher” culture, to great works
of art and literature; and without the skills (and maybe
the attention spans) to enjoy them; people would be less
able to engage with the world at a deep level. People
without exposure to great works and ideas might find
that [their] inner lives are shaped to a large degree
by market-led cultural products rather than works of
depth and profundity. (2015, p. 20)
We agree that such a scenario would be undesirable, but wish
to counterbalance this concern by reminding readers that it is
not unique to VR. It is a concern that can be applied in various
degrees to other media technology as well, going all the way back
to worries about the written word in Plato (Phaedrus 274d–275e).
The printing press, for example, can enable one to disseminate
great works of literature, but it can also enable the dissemination
of vulgarity – and it certainly changed our minds. Readers with
vulgar tastes can “immerse” themselves as they wish. The same
goes for photography and motion pictures. The important point
is as follows. There is no reason to doubt that works of great depth
and profundity can be produced by artists who choose VR as their
medium. Just as film emerged as a new predominant art form in
the twentieth century, so might VR in the twenty-first century. We
predict that immersive VR-technology will gradually lead to the
emergence of completely new forms of art (or even architecture,
see Pasqualini et al., 2013), which may be hard to conceive today,
but which will certainly have cultural consequences, perhaps
even in our understanding what an artistic subject and esthetic
subjectivity really are.

Neglect of Others and the Physical Environment

As users spend increasing time in virtual environments, there
is also a risk of their neglecting their own bodies and physical
environments – just as for many people today posing and engaging in disembodied social interactions via their Facebook account
has become more important than what was called “real life” in the
past. In extreme cases, individuals refuse to leave their homes for
extended periods of time, behavior categorized as “Hikikomori”
by the Japanese Ministry of Health. VR will enable us to interact
with each other in new ways, not through disembodied interaction, as in the texts, images, and videos of current social media,
but rather through what we have called the illusion of embodiment. We will interact with other avatars while embodied in our
own avatars. Or perhaps we will use augmented reality through
omni-directional cameras that allow us to enjoy the illusion of
being in the presence of someone who is far away in space and/
or time. To put it more provocatively, we may soon, as Norbert
Wiener anticipated many years ago, have the ability to “telegraph”
human beings (Wiener, 1954, p. 103–104). Telepresence is likely
to become a much more accessible, immediate, comprehensive,
and embodied experience.
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Our general recommendation on this theme is for focused
research into the following question: What, if anything,
is lost in cases of social interactions that are mediated
using advanced telepresence in VR? If such losses were
unnoticed, what negative effects for the human self-model
could be expected?

the children disrupt their playing indicate that this concern is
valid and serious.16
Clark (2003) takes a notably different approach to these kinds
of issues, raising the point that, instead of treating VR and related
technologies as a replacement for in-the-flesh interaction, we
should think of them as providing opportunities for new and
perhaps enhanced modes of human interaction. Rather than
unsatisfactory reproductions of familiar modes of interaction, the
technology should be developed with an eye toward “expanding
and reinventing our sense of body and action” (2003, p. 111).
Consider, for example, using a combination of substitutional and
augmented reality to see a representation of some of the physiological states of your partner who is many miles away – such
as a soft flash over the body in synchrony with the heartbeat (as
in Aspell et al., 2013). That and similar uses of the technology
could plausibly enhance embodied (though mediated) social
interaction. As with many other topics addressed here, future
research will be crucial for our understanding of which uses of the
technology will be best for enabling positive forms of (mediated)
social interaction.
Clark’s recommendation that we use the technology as an
enhancer rather than a replacement does have some appeal.
However, what counts as an “enhancement,” and what as therapy
or mere life-style decision, has been a topic of ethical debates for
a long time, for instance, in assessing the correct use of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011;
Metzinger, 2012). We should also note that his recommendation
may not entirely address the concerns raised by Dreyfus, Turkle,
and others. The foreseeable problem is that the general public simply will not share Clark’s vision, choosing to use the technology
as a de facto replacement for traditional modes of interaction (as
Turkle notes in the passage above). Are “Facebook-friendships”
social enhancements or social disabilities? In such a situation, we
must remain mindful of what may be lost, especially when the
technology may encourage less frequent “in-the-flesh” visits to
the infirm and immobile.
We wish to close this discussion of the ways in which VR might
attenuate our contact with others and with our physical environments by revisiting a point briefly made in the previous section
on a loss of authenticity during long-term immersion. As noted
above in the discussion of Nozick’s experience machine, many
readers might have the intuition that spending long periods of
time in virtual environments is “somehow inauthentic.” Yet, what
counts for the applied ethics of VR are not intuitions, but rather
rational arguments and empirical evidence. We would like to note
that a likely relevant factor here may be whether those long periods of immersion involve forms of intersubjective engagement
with others that are subjectively experienced as meaningful, and
how this experience is integrated into our culture. Along these
lines, one may suggest that the artificial nature of the virtual
environment is not as important compared to whether or not the
environment affords intersubjective engagement experienced as
meaningful (see Bostrom, 2003, p. 245–55 and Chalmers, 2005

This question has been a major theme in some of Hubert
Dreyfus’ work on the philosophy of technology. Dreyfus has
emphasized that mediating technologies may not capture
something of what is important for real-time interactions in the
flesh, what, following Merleau-Ponty, he calls “intercorporeality” (Dreyfus, 2001, p. 57). When we are not present in the
flesh with others, the context and mood of a situation may be
difficult to appreciate – if only because the bandwidth and the
resolution of our internal models are much lower. Perhaps more
importantly, there is a concern that mediating technologies will
not allow us to pick up on all of the subtle bodily cues that
appear to play a major role in social communication through
unconscious entrainment (Frith and Frith, 2007), cues that
involve ongoing embodied interaction (Gallagher, 2008; de
Jaegher et al., 2010).
In addition to the concerns about losing embodied signaling
for communication, we might also consider what is lost from
the sense modalities that are not (yet) integrated into VR. As
Sherry Turkle puts it, when these kinds of technology “keep
grandparents from making several-thousand-mile treks to see
their grandchildren in person (and there is already evidence
that they do), children will be denied something precious: the
starchy feel of a grandmother’s apron, the smell of her perfume
up close, and the taste of her cooking” (Harmon, 2008; Turkle,
2011, p. 342). Advances in technology could conceivably address
Turkle’s point about other perceptual modalities, but there
remains a question about what may be lost even if we can create
virtual content for other sense modalities.15 One recent finding
that should raise concern here is that depression is more likely in
older adults who have less social contact in person regardless of
their amount of telephone, written, and email contact (Teo et al.,
2015). Apart from this troubling finding, even if the technology
eventually enables rich social interaction through telepresence,
the concern remains that heavy use of such technology will lead
to neglect or even animosity toward one’s actual physical and
social environment. The recurring tragedies of parents with
“gamer rage” who have injured and killed their children because

All of these concerns bring up the question of whether the problem is merely a
shortcoming in the technology, or something more fundamental. That is, should
we only be concerned about losing important information through mediated interactions, information such as bodily cues and tactile sensations? If so, then advances
in technology can conceivably address that concern. Or is there something else
that is lost when not present in the flesh with others? It seems that thinkers such
as Dreyfus wish to suggest that there is something else that is lost when we lose
“intercorporeality,” something that cannot be captured with better and better technology. Still, it remains somewhat difficult to articulate what that “something else”
might be. One possibility is that social interactions that are mediated by advanced
technology lose some form of “authenticity” as discussed above. It is also worth
noting that our epistemic limitations may be relevant: in the case of VR, we do not
yet know the way in which social interaction will be altered.
15

Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org

For a list of examples, see: http://movingtolearn.ca/2013/gamer-rage-childabuse-a-growing-problem-deserving-our-attention (retrieved 1 December 2015).
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for similar ideas). This, of course, opens the possibility that
ultimately shallow or even largely meaningless social interactions (once again, think of today’s Facebook-“friendships” and
“likes”) are experienced as substantial by users who are really only
overwhelmed by the possibilities of future VR-technology, and
which are subsequently described as meaningful. A shallow form
of social interaction could then become culturally assimilated
and thereby “normalized” (Metzinger and Hildt, 2011, p. 247).
Normalization is a complex sociocultural process by which certain
new norms become accepted in societal practice, a process that is
often mediated by the availability of new technologies, a process
that changes our very own minds and which, therefore, carries
the risk of unnoticed self-deception. Here, we cannot explore this
rich (and controversial) philosophical territory, but note that it
may be relevant for grappling with the worry of “inauthenticity”
in virtual environments.

available for use after their human model is dead. Thus, we will be
able to “resurrect” the dead in VR. The ability to body-swap and
to interact with the dead in this way may offer great opportunity
for therapy in the hands of the beneficent, but it could easily lead
to profound trauma, especially in the hands of characters such as
Mr. Bungle, mentioned above.
These considerations raise difficult questions about which
regulatory actions would facilitate the best overall outcome. On
the one hand, there are good reasons for taking a fairly restrictive approach to avatar ownership. On the other hand, there are
also reasons for allowing individuals maximum freedom in their
creation and use of avatars. Of course, one’s approach to such
questions will likely reflect whether one’s political philosophy has
more paternalistic or libertarian leanings. We will consider the
reasons for each approach in turn.
A reasonable starting point on this issue would be to treat
avatars in an analogous manner to personality rights relating
to the publication of photos. They are public representations of
persons. Interestingly, societies and legal systems exhibit considerable differences in their underlying moral intuitions here.
One important conceptual issue here may be determining the
relevant degree of similarity between an avatar and a human person. Just as many accept the right of an individual to control the
commercial use of his or her name, image, likeness, one might,
for example, interpret the “right to my own avatar” a property
right as opposed to a personal right. Therefore, the validity of
the right of publicity could be taken to survive the death of the
biological individual. There will be new questions about the
ownership (and individuation) of avatars. The likeness between
a person and their avatar may or may not be an important factor.
Instead of likeness, we might individuate avatars by a unique
proper name that can be represented in the virtual space, as in
many video games. How does one assign an unequivocal identity to the virtual representation of a body or a person? Could
there be something like a chassis plate number, a license plate,
or a “virtual vehicle identification number? (VVIN)? We already
have digital object identifiers (DOIs) for electronic documents
and other forms of content, a form of persistent identification,
with the goal of permanently and unambiguously identifying
the object with which a given DOI is associated. But what about
an avatar that is currently used by a human operator, namely
by functionally and phenomenologically identifying with it?
Should we dynamically associate a “digital subject identifier”
(DSI) with it? There will also be questions about whether some
kinds of virtual activities should be censored. Examples of
such activities having to do with sex and violence are left to the
reader’s imagination. Another kind of content worth considering may be the use of virtual environments for indoctrination
into extremist groups.
With these initial thoughts in place, now consider the reasons
for taking a fairly strict regulatory stance on the ownership of
one’s own avatar. After mentioning the pressure from social
networks such as Facebook for users to use their real identities,
O’Brolcháin et al. recommend the development of technologies
similar to digital watermarking that would ensure “that only the
genuine owner of an avatar can use it” (2015, p. 22). Would this
perhaps have to be a “DSI,” as we proposed above? They suggest

Risky Content

Another main concern for users of VR is that of virtual content.
One might begin with the general rule of thumb that red lines
not to be crossed in reality should be the default red lines in VR.
One obvious problem, though, is that users will almost certainly
seek out VR as a way of crossing red lines with impunity. A
second possible problem is that this rule of thumb would make
VR even more subjectively real. One main issue here is whether
some particular kinds of content in VR should be discouraged
in various ways. Obvious candidates for such content would be
sex (virtual pedophilia, virtual rape) and violence. But there are
perhaps less obvious kinds of content that should be considered, such as content encouraging and reinforcing undesirable
personality traits, including those identified as the “dark triad”
(Paulus and Williams, 2002). The dark triad refers to narcissism,
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Individuals may find it
appealing to spend time in virtual worlds designed to reward
characters that exhibit traits associated with the dark triad. For
example, the MMORPG EVE Online is known for fostering a
style of play that involves manipulating and deceiving other
players. The VR version of EVE Online, EVE: Valkyrie, has been
described as “[u]ndoubtedly the most heavily anticipated virtual
reality game.”17 Based on some of the empirical results surveyed
above (see “Illusions of Embodiment and Their Lasting Effect”),
there is cause for concern about behavioral patterns rewarded in
immersive games such as EVE: Valkyrie having a lasting influence
on the psychological profile of users.
Apart from the behaviors encouraged by particular virtual
environments, there are concerns about the content that can be
created when users will have the freedom to create and design
their own avatars. For instance, one goal of our own project VERE
is to create software that enables untrained users to generate an
avatar that resembles any human being with fairly little time
and effort. This application would in principle allow for “body
swapping,” in which users enter the bodies of others (Petkova and
Ehrsson, 2008). It is also worth noting that these avatars will be

http://www.craveonline.com/culture/878953-top-10-virtual-reality-games-willconvince-strap-vr-headset#/slide/10 (retrieved 30 September 2015).
17

Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org

17

February 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 3

Madary and Metzinger

Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct

that such technology would help protect the autonomy and
privacy of users. Along the same lines, if one were to identify
strongly with one’s own avatar, the “theft” and use of that avatar
by another may be extremely disturbing. Importantly, avatar theft
may also create completely new opportunities for impersonation
and fraud, for example also using physical robots.
From a more theoretical point of view, we might distinguish
between internal and external self-models: the internal self-model
is in the brain of the user, and it is grounded in his or her body
(Metzinger, 2014), whereas external person- and body-models
can be created in virtual environments. Here, the specific, historically new kind of action that needs to be ethically assessed and
legally regulated takes place when a user identifies with a potential
external model of the self by dynamically integrating it with the
internal model of the self already active in his or her brain. The
core question seems to be what consequences we draw from
the potential for phenomenological ownership to legal notions of
ownership. Virtual identification can cause real suffering, and real
suffering is relevant for the law.
Without denying the value of protecting avatar ownership, we
would now like to consider two reasons for taking a less restrictive, more libertarian, approach. First, implementing control
over the use of particular avatars may be impractical. So far,
attempts to curb digital piracy using technology have not been
very successful, and there is no reason to think that things will
be different for avatars. In fact, regulation and control may be
even more difficult with avatars due to questions raised above
having to do with avatar individuation and degrees of similarity.
Say a user creates an avatar that is similar but not pixel-for-pixel
identical to another user’s avatar.18 Where precisely should we
draw the line between theft and acceptable similarity? Protecting
avatar ownership might lead to a regulatory quagmire. Even if the
appearance of the avatar is not highly relevant for ownership, we
would need to establish a widely accepted alternative method of
individuation, such as a unique proper name that cannot be easily
forged. The second reason for taking a less restrictive approach
would be out of concern for individual creative freedom. As noted
above, VR holds the promise of being a powerful new artistic
medium – the creative possibilities are astonishing. The fact that
regulations on avatar ownership may restrict those possibilities
must be taken into consideration.

Privacy

Privacy is, of course, a major concern with contemporary information technology (van den Hoven et al., 2014), and there are
further concerns about privacy with the foreseeable convergence
between VR and social networks (O’Brolcháin et al., 2016). Here,
we wish to offer only a few quick remarks on this topic, noting that
this issue deserves further attention. Commercial applications
of virtual environments introduce new possibilities for targeted
advertising or “neuromarketing,” thus attacking the individual’s
mental autonomy (Metzinger, 2015). By tracking the details of
one’s movements in VR, including eye movements, involuntary
facial gestures, and other indicators of what researchers call lowlevel intentions or “motor intentions” (Riva et al., 2011), private
agencies will be able to acquire details about one’s interests and
preferences in completely new ways (Coyle and Thorson, 2001).
If avatars themselves should in the future be used as “humanoid
interfaces,” consumers can be influenced and manipulated by
real-time feedback of the avatar’s own facial and eye movements (for example, via automatic and unconscious responses
in their mirror-neuron system; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
Commercials in VR could even feature images of the target audience himself or herself using the product. The use of big data
to “nudge” users (“Big Nudging”) combined with VR could have
long-lasting effects, perhaps producing changes in users’ mental
mechanisms themselves.
Users ought to be made aware that there is evidence that
advertising tactics using embodiment technology such
as VR can have a powerful unconscious influence on
behavior.

SUMMARY
In this article, we have considered some of the risks that may arise
with the commercial and research use of VR. We have offered
some concrete recommendations and noted areas in which
further ethical deliberation will be required. One main theme of
the article is that there are several open empirical questions that
should be urgently addressed in a beneficent research environment in order to mitigate risks and raise awareness for users of VR
in the general public. More research is needed. Here, one of our
main goals was to provide a first set of ethical recommendations
as a platform for future discussions, a set of normative starting
points that can be continuously refined and expanded as we go
along (see Table 1).
Let us end by making one more general point, an observation
which is of a more philosophical nature. VR is the representation
of possible worlds and possible selves, with the aim of making
them appear as real as possible – ideally, by creating a subjective
sense of “presence” in the user. Interestingly, some of our best
theories of the human mind and conscious experience itself
describe it in a very similar way: leading current theories of brain
dynamics (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015) describe it as
the constant creation of internal models of the world, predictively
generating hypotheses – virtual neural representations – about

Avatar ownership and individuation will be an important
issue for regulatory agencies to consider. There are strong
reasons to place restrictions on the way in which avatars
can be used, such as protecting the interests and privacy of
individuals who strongly identify with their own particular avatar on social networks. On the other hand, these
restrictions may prove impractical to implement and may
unnecessarily limit personal creative freedom.

The importance of personal identity for moral philosophy is well-known (Parfit,
1984; Shoemaker, 2014). The considerations here introduce the additional complication of identity for virtual representations of persons. See Vallor (2010, especially
pp. 166–167) and Rodogno (2012) for insightful discussions.
18
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TABLE 1 | VERE code of conduct for the ethical use of VR in research and by the general public.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE RESEARCH ETHICS OF VR
1. Non-maleficence
a. No experiment should be conducted using virtual reality with the foreseeable consequence that it will cause involuntary suffering or serious or lasting harm to a
subject.
b. A rational, evidence-based identification and minimization of risks (also those pertaining to a more distant future) ought to be a part of research itself.
2. Informed consent
a. Informed consent for VR experiments ought to include an explicit statement to the effect that immersive VR can have lasting behavioral influences on subjects, and
that some of these risks may be presently unknown.
b. Experimental VR research should not be carried out on subjects incapable of informed consent.
3. Transparency and media ethics
a. In experimental work developing new clinical applications, researchers should be careful not to create false hopes in patients by repeatedly reminding them of the
merely experimental nature of the research.
b. VR researchers aiming at new clinical applications should work in close collaboration with physicians who may be better situated to make informed judgments about
the suitability of particular patients for new trials.
c. Scientists and the media need to be clear and honest with the public about scientific progress, and not only in the area of using VR for medical treatment.
d. In interacting with the media, scientists should cultivate a proactive attitude, especially if they are the first to become aware of novel types of risks through their own
work. Communication with the public, if needed, should be self-initiated, an act of taking control and acting in advance of a future situation, rather than just reacting.
4. Dual use
a. Potential military applications of VR, AR, and SR should be closely monitored by policy makers and funding agencies alike.
b. Torture in a virtual environment is still torture. The fact that one’s suffering occurs while one is immersed in a virtual environment does not mitigate the suffering itself.
c. Policy makers should aim at international arrangements among countries to add VR, AR, and SR in a process to harmonize lists of dual-use technologies to be
controlled.
5. Internet research
a. The scientific community has to take steps to avoid the abuse of informed consent with this technology, especially in the interest of preserving public trust.
b. The ability to toggle between VR, AR, and SR may create situations in which users are not able to maintain an understanding of when their informed consent to
share information is in effect. Users should be repeatedly reminded within VR that they have given informed consent.
6. The Limitations of a Code of Conduct
a. Scientists must understand that following a code of ethics is not the same as being ethical. A domain-specific ethics code, however consistent, developed, and
fine-grained future versions of it may be, can never function as a substitute for ethical reasoning itself.
b. Such reasoning must be conducted in a way that is sensitive to the contextual and implementational details of particular experimental paradigms, details that cannot
be captured by a general code of conduct.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USE OF VR BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC
1. Long-term immersion
a. Longitudinal studies and further research into the psychological effects of long-term immersion are needed.
b. Users must be made aware that these studies are seriously limited in that they will, due to ethical constraints, exclude users who may be most vulnerable (such as
children or those with latent mental illness). Some of these vulnerabilities may be unknown to science and unknown to the users themselves.
2. Increasing virtualization of social interactions – we call for focused research, large longitudinal studies, into the following questions:
a. What, if anything, is lost in cases of social interactions that are mediated using advanced telepresence in VR?
b. If such losses were unnoticed, what negative effects for the human self-model could be expected?
3. Risky content
a. As compared to the viewing of traditional movies containing graphic violence or pornography, the impact of full immersion settings and the associated risk of users
suffering psychological trauma will steadily increase as VR technology advances. Users have to be made aware of this possibility.
b. VR technology holds the potential to create robust social hallucinations, to directly manipulate the sense of agency, to modulate personality traits via identification
with virtual characters, or to causally interact with deeper levels of self-consciousness (UI-manipulation). Users have to be made aware of this possibility.
c. Avatar ownership will be an important issue for regulatory agencies to consider. There are strong reasons to place restrictions on the way in which avatars can be
used, such as protecting the interests and privacy of individuals who strongly identify with their own particular avatar on social networks. On the other hand, these
restrictions may prove impractical to implement and may unnecessarily limit personal creative freedom. Regulators must strike a rational balance between these
concerns.
4. Privacy
a. Users ought to be made aware that there is evidence that advertising tactics using embodiment technology, such as VR, can have a powerful unconscious influence
on behavior. For example, a combination of “Big Nudging” strategies (collecting big data for the purposes of nudging the general public) with VR technology could
have long-lasting effects, which might also affect underlying mental mechanisms themselves.
b. Data protection: users ought to be made aware of new risks involving surveillance, such as reading out “motor intentions” or a “kinematic fingerprint” during avatar
use.
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the hidden causes of sensory input through probabilistic inference. Slightly earlier, some philosophers (Revonsuo, 1995, p. 55;
Revonsuo, 2009, p. 115.; Metzinger, 2003, p. 556; 2008, 2009a, p.
6, 23, pp. 104–108; Westerhoff, 2015 for overview and discussion)
have pointed out at length how conscious experience exactly is a
virtual model of the world, a dynamic internal simulation, which
in standard situations cannot be experienced as a virtual model
because it is phenomenally transparent – we “look through it” as
if we were in direct and immediate contact with reality. What is
historically new, and what creates not only novel psychological
risks but also entirely new ethical and legal dimensions, is that
one VR gets ever more deeply embedded into another VR: the
conscious mind of human beings, which has evolved under very
specific conditions and over millions of years, now gets causally
coupled and informationally woven into technical systems for
representing possible realities. Increasingly, it is not only culturally and socially embedded but also shaped by a technological
niche that over time itself quickly acquires a rapid, autonomous
dynamics and ever new properties. This creates a complex convolution, a nested form of information flow in which the biological
mind and its technological niche influence each other in ways we

are just beginning to understand. It is this complex convolution
that makes it so important to think about the Ethics of VR in a
critical, evidence-based, and rational manner.
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